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Abstract 
EU-China economic interactions became more and more frequent in the past decades, 
nowadays EU and China are main trade partner for each other. This paper analyzed 
EU-China economic interactions from three dimensions: bilateral governmental 
interactions, trade and investment flows as well as barriers to trade and investment. 
Findings show that EU-China close relationship is particularly based on goods trade 
especially on intra-industrial trade of manufacturing industrial products, and trade 
imbalance is arising from trade in Machinery and Transport Equipment and Other 
Manufactured Goods (e.g., Clothing and clothing accessories); This paper also found 
that there exist a myriad of trade and investment barriers to EU-China interactions, 
including both tariff and non-tariff obstacles. Therefore, this paper argued that if EU 
and China want to handle the trade imbalance efficiently, they must improve 
composition of trade in goods, while essentially, it requires lessening or eliminating 
EU-China trade barriers which hampered trade composition improvement. 
Key words: EU-China Relations, Trade, Trade Barriers, FDI 
JEL codes: F13; F59; 
 
1. Introduction 
China‟s development in the past decades has caused fierce attention from all over the 
world. As a country who has more than 1.3 billion population, its annual average 
economic growth is over 10% (real GDP growth) in the past 30 years, from 1980s to 
2000s. Undoubtedly, China‟s economic boom particularly gains from his Reform and 
Opening-up policies starting in the end of 1970s. In the third plenary session of 11
th
 
central committee of CCP held in 1978, Chinese government decided to quit the idea 
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of “economy subject to politics” and transformed to reform the economic system as 
well as to open the “Country‟s Gate” to the world, since then, promoting economy 
development became the core task of government. Opening-up policy firstly applied 
to eastern coastal regions in 1980s and then enlarged to entire country in the early of 
1990s, yet CCP proposed to give up Planned Economic System partially and try to 
build Socialist Market Economic System in 1992. Easily government and enterprises 
found that China hold strong advantage of labor force comparative with other 
countries, thus export-oriented strategy became the prior tactic of economic 
development under the condition of insufficient domestic demand. 
Finally, exports became one of the three driven factors (consume, investment and 
export) of China‟s economic growth in the past decades. Proportion of total exports 
and imports to GDP and of total exports to GDP were just 12.54% and 5.97% in 1980, 
and then they increased to 29.78% and 15.99% in 1990, and 39.58% and 20.80% in 
2000. In 2006, these two proportions reached the highest points, 65.17% and 35.87%. 
Since the global financial crisis exploding in 2007, China‟s exports trade was affected 
significantly by the global economic crisis, the proportion of total exports and imports 
to GDP and proportion of total exports to GDP reduced in recent years, but they still 
stood at 50.28% and 26.68% in 2010. Moreover, government also launched many 
preferential policies, such as income tax exemption or reduction, for attracting foreign 
capitals to invest in China. Actual utilized FDI was only $3.49bn in 1990, and 
increased to $40.72bn in 2000, it reached $105.74bn in 2010
1
. These facts adequately 
proved that international economic and trade interactions are exactly very important to 
China‟s economic development.  
Nowadays China has been the second exports economy and third imports 
economy in the world. And, as the largest exporter and importer in the world, EU has 
been an important export destination and source of imports and FDI of China. By 
March 2004, European Union (EU) became the largest trade partner of China and 
China turn to the second largest trade partner of EU (Dai, 2006). Actually, Since 
European Economic Community (EEC) and China established diplomatic relations in 
1975, EU-China economic and trade relations became more and more close. EU 
commission stated EU-China relations as “Closer Partner, Growing Responsibilities”, 
although competition from China especially in some manufacturing sectors raised 
serious challenges (EU Commission, 2006). However, China‟s huge market is 
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undoubtedly an attractiveness to European companies, trading with China can create 
jobs and promote EU‟s economic growth, competition from China can impel 
European companies to manage cost and reinforce their comparative advantages, for 
example on technology and innovation capability, this implies EU actually can not 
only keep competitiveness but also gain a lot from trading with China. Based on the 
same logic perspective, evidently China also can gain from trading with EU including 
investment and technology transfers. Therefore, it is uncontroversial to conclude that 
EU-China economic and trade interactions are a progress of reciprocity and mutual 
benefit. 
Nevertheless, one of the preconditions for EU and China maximizing benefits 
from trade and economic partnership is that both sides must open their market and 
ensure fair competition (Lorca-Susino, 2006), namely must reduce exchange cost as 
far as possible. But in fact, there exist a myriad of trade barriers between EU and 
China, especially non-tariff obstacles, which are main factors of high EU-China 
economic exchange cost. China‟s market is not open entirely, and also it is reported 
that protectionism is on the rise in Europe (Ashton, 2009). Generally China is treated 
as manufacturing economy based on the competitive advantage of cheap labor and  
land (Dai, 2006), this advantage makes China can produce merchandises with much 
more lower cost, and at the same time, Chinese government also support export 
through subsidy, exchange regulation and some other policies, yet some industries are 
still not open to foreign investment. EU sets some barriers to trade and investment, 
and also keeps some restriction on sensitive products, the main instruments are 
technical barrier to trade (TBT) and anti-dumping measures (Brülhart & Matthews, 
2007).  
This paper will briefly investigate the overview of EU-China economic relations 
through introducing the status quo and barriers of EU-China trade and investment. 
The first section will introduce the bilateral governmental interactions, the second 
section will analyzes the status quo of EU-China trade and investment, and it will 
mainly focus on the industrial structure of EU-China trade. The third section will 
discuss various trade and investment barriers to EU-China through some cases. And 
the final part is the conclusions and remarks. 
 
2. EU-China Bilateral Governmental Interactions 
China and EEC established diplomatic relations in 1975, and in 1985, EEC and China 
launched the first trade and economic cooperation agreement, “Agreement on Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Between European Economic Community and the 
People‟s Republic of China”, which involved trade cooperation and economic 
cooperation, and also established EC-China Joint Committee to manage the 
cooperation relationship (Council of EC & Government of P. R. China, 1985). Trade 
cooperation targets on creating favorable conditions for bilateral trade and grants each 
other most-favored nation treatment, such as lower customs duties and charges, 
simplifying regulation, procedures and formalities, and so on. This bilateral agreement 
continues to be the main legal framework of EU-China trade and economic relations 
(Griese, 2006), and it is updated on 9
th
 EU-China Summit held in Helsinki in 2006. 
After 1985 agreement, the scale of EU-China trade increased sharply especially in 
1990s
2
. In terms of statistical data, EU‟s exports to China was only €1.9bn and just 
ranked No.24 in EU‟s exports partners in 1980, exports value increased to €5.8bn and 
China ranked No.13 in 1990. While in 1998, the value increased to €17.4bn, and 
China became the fourth largest exports trade partner. On the imports side, value of 
EU‟s imports from China was only €2.0bn and China ranked No.22 in EU‟s imports 
partners in 1980, then imports value increased to €10.4bn and China rose to No.5. In 
1998, EU‟s imports from China reached €42.0bn and China became the third largest 
imports trade partner of EU
3
. 
 
Table 1. EU-China Key Governmental Interactions 
Year Actions 
1975  Established diplomatic relations between China and EEC.  
1985 
 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between European Economic 
Community and the People‟s Republic of China. 
1998 
 EU-China Summit (annually, the 14th Summit was held in Feb. 2012). 
 EU Communication [COM(1998)181] : Building a comprehensive partnership with 
China.  
2001 
 EU Communication [COM(2001)265 final]: further enhancement of engagement 
with China; China is both part of the problem and the solution to all major issues of 
international and regional concern. 
 Established a Comprehensive Partnership formally coming with the China‟s WTO 
accession.  
2003 
 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
 EU Commission [COM(2003)533final]: A maturing partnership-shared interests and 
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challenges in EU-China relations. 
2006 
 On 9th EU-China Summit (Helsinki), decided to start negotiation on a PCA 
(EU-China Partnership & Cooperation Agreement), PCA will cover both political 
and economic dimension of EU-China relations. 
 And, also involve an upgrade of Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
launched in 1985. 
2008 
 High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED, annually, 1st meeting was held on 
25 April in Beijing). 
 HED provides a tool to address issues of mutual concern in the areas of investment, 
market access and intellectual property rights protection, as well as other issues 
related to trade.   
Source: Author‟s depiction. 
 
In 1990s, China‟s economy reform and development reflected new changes, 
especially China started to transform from a centrally-planned and largely closed 
economy towards an increasingly market-driven economy after 1992, in when CCP 
proposed and tried to build Socialist Market Economic System (EU Commission, 
1998). EU commission stated that, on the one hand, China has made considerable 
efforts to reform and develop market economy as well as became more and more 
responsible in foreign policy. On the other hand, EU also worried about whether 
China can continue to reform in post-Deng Xiaoping era and handle the shock from 
Asian financial crisis exploded in 1997. Thus EU think it is necessary to amend its 
approach to China based on new assessments (Smith & Xie, 2010), and then EU 
commission launched a new approach named “Building a Comprehensive Partnership 
with China” in March 19984. The new policy mainly aimed EU-China partnership at 
engaging China further in the international community through an upgraded political 
dialogue, supporting China‟s transition to an open society, and integrating China 
further in the world economy by promoting China more fully into the world trading 
system and supporting China‟s economic and social reform (EU Commission, 1998). 
Yet On 2 April 1998, the 1
st
 EU-China Summit was held in London and it was pinned 
down as an interaction and communication mechanism which is held annually. This 
summit built an efficient plate for discussing bilateral political and economic 
interactions as well as some other joint concerns. 
On 15 May 2001, EU published updated policies “Strategy Towards China: 
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Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a More Effective 
EU Policy” in consideration of China‟s forthcoming accession to WTO(EU 
Commission, 2001). Obviously, this strategy included two parts, the first one was to 
evaluate the implementation outcomes of building comprehensive partnership with 
China, and the second one is to supplement policies based on new situation. Coming 
with China‟s accession to WTO on 11 December 2001, the comprehensive partnership 
was established formally. After two years, EU Commission published the policy paper 
“A maturing partnership-shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations”, 
which stated that “EU and China have an ever-greater interest to work together as 
strategic partner to safeguard and promote sustainable development, peace and 
stability”(EU Commission, 2003). This approach especially focuses on support 
sectoral cooperation through strengthening or launching sectoral dialogues. On 9
th
 
EU-China Summit (Helsinki, 9 September, 2006), EU and China decided to start open 
negotiation on a PCA (EU-China Partnership & Cooperation Agreement), PCA will 
cover both political and economic dimension of EU-China relations, 9
th
 EU-China 
Summit also involved an upgrade of “Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement” 
launched in 1985. In 2008, EU-China 1
st
 High Level Economic and Trade 
Dialogue(HED) was held in Beijing, it was claimed that HED provides a tool to 
address issues of mutual concern in the areas of investment, market access and 
intellectual property rights protection, as well as other issues related to trade.  
 
3. EU-China Trade and Investment Interactions 
 
3.1 EU-China Goods Trade Flows 
Following previous rough discussion of the evolution of EU-China interactions, both 
EU and China treat each other as an important economic partner, and they are 
attempting to build a high level partnership through frequent and stable negotiation or 
dialogue mechanism. Frequent dialogues and political interactions played a significant 
role on EU-China trade relations. As mentioned previously, China has been the No.1 
export partner and No.2 import partner of EU, trade scale enlarged over 4 times in the 
past ten years, obviously both EU and China gained a lot of benefits from bilateral 
trading. In 1999, EU-27 exported €19.66bn goods to China and imported €52.60bn 
goods from China. While by 2010, EU‟s exports to China increased to €113.25bn, and 
imports from China rose to €282.51bn. 
  
Figure1. EU-China Goods Trade Trends(Billion Euro, 1999-2010) 
 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
 
However, as the largest trading partner of China, EU has been troubled by the 
huge trade deficit with China in a long time. After China accession to WTO, EU 
cancelled many imports limitation in terms of the principle of WTO, and then imports 
from China increased sharply due to China‟s advantages of production cost. As a 
result, EU‟s trade deficit with China rose by a large margin, from only €32.94bn in 
1999 to €169.26bn in 2010(Table 1). In terms of a rough product classification, 
notably EU‟s trade deficit with China is particularly contributed by Machinery, 
Transport Equipment and other manufactured products(e.g. textile, clothing, iron and 
steel, etc.), balances of other goods trade, except food, drinks and tobacco, are 
positive. In 2000, deficit created by the trade of Machinery and Transport Equipment 
and Other Manufactured Goods were €11.21bn and €35.78bn respectively, by 2010, 
they reached €75.37bn and €99.81bn. Summed these two industries, total deficit was 
€175.18bn (Table 2). By a specific classification of industries, main contributors to 
2010 EU‟s trade deficit with China are (Appendix Table 2): Telecommunication, 
sound, TV, video (€35.77bn); Office machines and Computers (€39.21bn); Electrical 
machinery (€29.36bn); Clothing and clothing accessories (€30.11bn); and other 
miscellaneous manufactured articles (€23.38bn). 
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Table 2. Product Breakdown of EU Trade in Goods with China (Billion Euro) 
Industries 
EU Export to China EU Import from China Balance 
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Food, Drinks and 
Tobacco  
0.439 0.797 2.239 1.525 2.267 4.004 -1.086 -1.47 -1.765 
Raw Materials  1.417 3.297 7.702 1.571 2.411 2.690 -0.154 0.886 5.012 
Energy Products  0.162 0.064 0.742 0.402 0.731 0.304 -0.24 -0.667 0.438 
Chemicals  2.421 5.180 12.661 2.805 5.178 11.014 -0.384 0.002 1.647 
Machinery and 
Transport 
Equipment  
16.528 31.002 69.612 27.739 75.082 144.989 -11.211 -44.08 -75.377 
Other 
Manufactured 
Goods  
4.285 10.268 18.510 40.066 74.052 118.317 -35.781 -63.784 -99.807 
Non-classifying 
Goods  
0.611 1.217 1.806 0.524 0.606 1.213 0.807 0.611 0.593 
Total  25.863 51.825 113.272 74.632 160.327 282.531 -48.769 -108.502 -169.259 
Source: EU Trade Yearbook 2011(EUSTAT, 2011).  
 
Moreover, EU-China trade is mainly based on the intra-industrial trade of some 
manufacturing industrial products, i.e. Machinery and Transport Equipment as well as 
Other Manufactured Goods. Actually, both China and EU have comparative 
advantages on these products. Statistical data showed that share of Chemicals, 
Manufactured goods classified by material, Machinery and Transport Equipment and 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles in total exports of EU-27 reached 83% in 2010, 
of which Machinery and Transport Equipment shared 42.4%, and share of those 
products of China reached 94.61%, of which Machinery and Transport Equipment 
shared 49.13%(Appendix Table 1). From the perspective of EU-China goods trade, it 
also can be found that EU and China export and import manufacturing industrial 
products from each other. In 2010, EU-27 exported €69.61bn Machinery and 
Transport Equipment to China, which accounted for 61.45% in total exports to China. 
And China exported €144.99bn Machinery and Transport Equipment to EU, which 
accounted for 51.32% in total exports to EU. Sum up Machinery and Transport 
Equipment and Other Manufactured Goods, EU-27 exported €88.12bn to China, the 
share reached 77.80%, and China exported €263.31 to EU, the share reached 93.20% 
in 2010. Imports products of EU and China from each other reflected the same 
status(Table 2). To some extent, these evidences exactly proved that, as the same as 
world trade trends which have been proved by Krugman‟s New Trade Theory, 
EU-China trade takes place particularly on intra-industries. This conclusion is also 
proved by Beneyto et al.(2011: p.17), whose analysis used a quantitative method 
based on EU‟s member state trade with China, calculation showed Intra-Industrial 
Global Trade Index with China of selected EU member states increased dramatically 
from 1995 to 2009.  
 
3.2 EU-China Services Trade and Capital Flows 
Other dimensions related to economic relations are services trade and capital mobility. 
Comparative with trade in goods, scale of services trade and FDI flows between EU 
and China are much smaller. In 2010, EU-China commercial services export trade was 
only €22.3bn and the balance was positive. FDI flows from EU to China was €6.5bn 
in 2009, only accounting for 5.39% of China‟s total inward FDI, yet accumulative 
value was €63.6bn, sharing 6.71% of total values. China‟s inward FDI are mainly 
from abroad Chinese countries or regions, over half of FDI are from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Singapore, and their total shares reached 54.81% in 2009. Some free ports, 
for example, British Virgin Islands (BVI), are also the main source of China‟s FDI, in 
2009, 12.01% of China‟s inward FDI are from BVI5. Actually, BVI has many 
companies which is built by Chinese businessman or institutions, it is said that more 
than 25% of companies registered in BVI are related to China. Some Mainland 
Chinese are willing to register companies in international free ports, because it is easy 
to register and also can get benefit from tax avoidance, and then, if they go back to 
invest in China, they can enjoy the preferential policy of supporting FDI (income tax 
exemption or reduction, as for investing in industries which is in the official 
encourage list, income tax will be exempted in the first three years and half income 
tax will be levied in the subsequent two years). Anyway, goods trade is the leading 
role of EU-China economic and trade relations rather than capital mobility and 
services trade. 
 
Table 3. EU-China Economic and Trade Indicators (Billion Euro) 
Dimensions 
EU27 to China China to EU27 Balance 
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Trade in Goods  78.4 82.4 113.3 247.9 214.1 282.5 -169.5 -131.8 -169.3 
Trade in services  20.2 19.1 22.3 15.2 13.6 16.3 5.0 5.4 6.0 
FDI  
Flows  6.9 6.5 7.1 -0.4 0.1 0.7 6.9 6.5 6.4 
Stocks  54.7 63.6 75.1 5.6 5.6 6.7 49.1 57.9 68.4 
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4. Trade and Investment Barriers between EU and China 
 
4.1 Attitude Determines Action 
China‟s market is important to EU‟s products, and EU also would like to gain 
deserved benefits from the economic boom of China, thus general speaking, EU‟s 
attitude of economic interactions to China tends to be more liberal. But in fact, EU‟s 
decision is based on the common actions of member states, those states who play a 
leading role was the common decision maker to a great extent.  
 
Figure 2. EU Member States Attitudes to China 
 
Sources: Fox & Godement (2009, p.4). 
 
EU member states can be divided into four types in term of their attitudes to China 
(Fox & Godement, 2009: p.4): Type-A is assertive industrialists, such as Czech, 
Poland and Germany. These kinds of countries tend to pressure China on both 
economic and politic dimensions, and support using protective measures to threaten 
China‟s trade barriers; Type-B is called ideological free-traders, representative 
countries like Netherlands, Sweden Denmark and UK. They tend to pressure China on 
politics in order to promote China reduce barriers rather than restrict trade directly, 
and they also claim that EU should focus on the point of benefiting from China‟s 
growth rather than being threatened by Chinese cheap products; Type-C is 
accommodating mercantilists which are the largest group, including such as Finland, 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Romania and so on. They claim that keeping good political 
relationship with China will create commercial benefits, so economic considerations 
must dominate the relationships, but they also treat protective measures as an useful 
tool. The last type is European followers, they don‟t consider the relationship with 
China to be the core of their foreign policies and are not willing to take part in 
actively in the debate of issues that China is not a key EU priority. So this type of 
states prefers to follow EU‟s policies rather than lead policies decision. In terms of the 
idea of Fox and Godement(2009), most of EU active member states held an attitude of 
maintaining political dialogue and treating protective measures as an useful trade 
instrument. Therefore, if more conservative states play a leading role in the process of 
decision making, the common external trade policy could be more protective 
especially facing a huge trade deficit with China. Actually, EU maintains common 
protective measures against external countries including both tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers (Mullally, O‟Brien & Stephenson, 2005: p.8). 
China is perhaps the best case of openness and growth in the past decades due to 
its positive reform on economic system, pricing mechanism and trade system, 
especially China government implemented a strong policies to support export in order 
to develop economy (Lardy, 2003). EU‟s huge market is very attractive to Chinese 
products, China wants to maximize its benefits from EU‟s market, and at the same 
time, to protect its domestic industries as well. Fox and Godement(2009) concluded 
China‟s approach to EU in order to achieve its goals as 
“To secure these goals, China has developed three basic tactics in its 
approach to the EU. First, it takes advantage of the mismatch between its 
own centrally controlled systems and the EU’s open market and government 
to exploit opportunities in Europe while protecting its own economy with 
industrial policies, restricted access and opaque procedures. Second, China 
channels EU pressure on specific issues by accepting formal dialogues and 
then turning them into inconclusive talking shops. Third, China exploits the 
divisions between Member States.”  
----John Fox & François Godement (2009, p.8)  
Notably China‟s attitude to EU is unambiguous, it treats EU as an important 
export market and wants to gain more from trading or investing with EU. But 
meanwhile, it also tries to keep its comparative advantages through making use of 
various promoting or protective measures. Specially, China emphasizes its identity of 
being a underdeveloped country and being a market economy country in order to 
enjoy the preferential supports from EU as well as promote EU to eliminate those 
restrictions specially exerting on central-controlled economy country.  
Therefore, it is not surprising if there exist some strong trade barriers including 
both tariff and non-tariff between EU and China. Upcoming discussions will focus on 
obvious main obstacles to EU-China bilateral trade and investment, i.e. tariff barriers, 
non-tariff barriers and investment barriers (Table 4). Discussion will not describe or 
evaluate their effect on EU-China economic interactions, but prove that these barriers 
indeed exist and cannot be ignored. 
 
Table 4. Trade and Investment Barriers Between EU and China 
Types EU Actions on China‟s Goods/Capital China Actions on EU Goods/Capital 
Tariff 
Barriers 
 Discriminatory Duties 
 Anti-dumping Duties  
 Anti-subsidy Duties 
 Relatively higher tariffs rate(under WTO 
rules) 
 Anti-dumping Duties (e.g. on potato 
starch starting in February 2007; on 
X-Ray security equipment starting in Jan. 
2011) 
Nontariff 
Barriers 
 Technical Barriers: Green or 
environmental protection standards 
(e.g. Foods, Textile, electronic 
equipment such as Freezer,  
Air-conditions) 
 Export Restrictions(especially on 
Hi-tech products in order to keep 
intellectual property and keep 
advantages in the future)  
 Arms sale ban (due to political 
considerations)  
 Dumping 
 Subsidies (especially on agricultural 
products) 
 Anti-dumping investigations  
 Anti-subsidy investigations 
 Subsidies and Exports Tax Rebates 
 Quotas and License Regulation 
 Non-transparent Trade Rules 
 Exchange regulation 
 Anti-dumping investigations  
 Anti-subsidy investigations (on potato 
starch in 2011, this is the first time to do 
an anti-subsidy investigation on EU 
products ) 
 Dumping (especially currency dumping 
and social dumping) 
Capital 
Mobility 
Barriers  
 Foreign Investment Restrictions and 
National Security Review on foreign 
investors‟ merger actions. [e.g. U.K. 
(Enterprise Act 2002, Chapter 2), 
France(Article 30 of Law No. 
2004-1343, Dec. 2004) and Germany 
(German Foreign Trade Act, 2009)]  
 Foreign Investment Regulation 
(Guidance Catalogue, Regulations) and 
National Security Review on foreign 
investors merger actions (launched in 
Feb. 2011 ) 
 Non-transparent  regulations  
Source: Author‟s depiction. 
 
4.2 Tariff Barriers 
Coming with globalization trends, every country has realized the importance of free 
trading, both developed and developing countries have been reducing their import 
tariff rate recent decades, thus the importance of tariff barriers has declined or it is not 
a key obstacle to free trading in the future. In terms of a measurement, EU-15 average 
tariff rate on import goods from external countries was 1.54% by 2002 (Global Britain, 
2004). Towards to China‟s import tariff rate, China actually began to reduce after 
implementing opening-up policy and it dropped sharply in 1990s in order to access to 
WTO, the average import tariff rate stood at a very high level, more than 50% in 1982, 
it reduced to 40% in 1993, and then dropped to 15.3% in 2001(Lardy, 2003; 
SCIO,2011). After accession to WTO, China continued to reduce the tariff rate 
according to the commitment, average tariff rate decreased to 9.9% in 2005 and 9.8% 
in 2010(SCIO, 2011).  
Therefore, Ashton (2009) argued that trade and investment barriers between EU 
and China are not those arising from tariffs already, but those caused by non-tariffs 
fields, such as various rules and standards. However, it seems inaccurate to claim that 
there are no tariff barriers to EU-China trading. In fact, tariff is still treated as a useful 
instrument by both EU and China. Generally EU imposes a higher tariff on products, 
especially on basic goods (such as foods and textile, which developing country have 
an advantage) from developing countries than on products from developed countries. 
Mullally, O‟Brien & Stephenson(2005) found that rich countries(GDP per capita is 
more than £15000 a year) just faced an average 1.6% tariff imposed by EU, middle 
income countries were imposed an average 2.9% tariff, while poor countries(GDP per 
capita is less than £5000 a year) were imposed an highest tariff rate, 5% on average. 
Imposing discriminatory duties on products from different income countries implies 
China is suffering a higher trade defense from EU than other rich countries.  
A frequently-used approach of EU to China is to levy anti-dumping duties on 
products importing from China. Taking the anti-dumping duty on China‟s ceramic 
tiles as an example, after one year investigation(from April 2009 to March 2010), EU 
decided to impose a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles 
originating in China, this highest duty rate reached 73%(EU Commission, 2011a). On 
12 September, EU published a definitive anti-dumping duty rate, the highest one 
reached 69.7% (EU Council, 2011a). EU stated that China‟s ceramic tiles products 
exactly sold as a lower price in EU than that in China domestic market and products 
of EU‟s companies and finally injured EU‟s related industries. Nevertheless, a 
research report stated that export prices from China are highly differentiated and most 
of Chinese exporters sold at a higher price than those companies of many EU member 
states, and China‟s products only shared 6.5% in EU market, while EU producers 
shared 90%, thus EU‟s anti-dumping measures are inappropriate (Kasteng, 2012).  
As for anti-subsidy duties EU imposing on China‟s products, there are some cases 
too. On 6 May 2011, EU commission published the first anti-subsidy tariffs against 
imports from China after 15 months investigation, EU stated that Chinese government 
subsidized coated fine paper industry by giving cheap loans, cheap land and some 
preferential tax policies which are illegal under WTO rules, then EU decided to 
impose anti-subsidy duties on coated fine paper from China with duties ranging from 
4% to 12%(EU Council, 2011b). At the same time, EU also decided to impose 
anti-dumping duties on coated fine paper with duties ranging from 20% to 39.1% (EU 
Council, 2011c). This implies that EU imposes both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
duties on the same product (coated fine paper) imported from China. Of course, EU‟s 
action caused a protest from China, Chinese government argued that imposing both 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on the same product is a double remedial 
behavior to EU industry and it goes against the WTO rules. 
As a response to EU‟s actions, Chinese government launched some anti-dumping 
and anti-subsidy measures on EU‟s products and has begun to impose anti-dumping 
duties and anti-subsidy duties on some products imported from EU as well. For 
example, on 6 February 2007, China started to impose anti-dumping duties on potato 
starch imported from EU with duration of 5 years. China decided to recheck and still 
levy anti-dumping duties during rechecking period; And on 23 January 2011, Chinese 
government decided to impose anti-dumping duties on X-Ray security equipment 
imported from EU with duties ranging from 33.5% to 71.8%. On 16 September 2011, 
China decided to impose anti-subsidy duty on potato starch from EU after with a duty 
ranging between 7.5% to 12.4%, it is also the first time to impose anti-subsidy duty on 
EU product, and in fact, on 19 April 2011, China has began to impose anti-dumping 
duty on the same product from EU with duty ranging from 12.6% to 56.7%. Moreover, 
as mentioned previously, China‟s import tariff rate is still higher relatively, although it 
will continue to decrease in terms of the commitment to WTO rules, it is also can be 
treated as a tariff barriers to trading. 
In sum, although there are some other kind of anti-dumping measures, such as 
warranting deposit, price commitment during the investigation, some rules and 
standards, EU and China governments still treat imposing duties as an important 
remedial measure and exert on goods trade frequently in order to protect domestic 
industries or as a reaction to anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures from opposite 
side. Therefore, tariffs, including normal duty as well as anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy duties are still the barrier to EU-China trade, which exactly cause profit 
loss of consumers as the conclusion has been proved by classical trade theory. 
4.3 Non-Tariff Barriers 
Non-tariff barriers refer to the barriers such as import quotas, subsidies, rules, 
standards and regulations, which a country or a region who uses a common external 
trade policy used in order to protect domestic industries, Non-tariff barrier has been a 
most preferable and popular measure used by governments in modern world. 
Naturally, EU and China government also prefer to exert non-tariff barriers on each 
other‟s trade and investment.  
Subsidy measure is mainly exploited by EU on agriculture through the framework 
of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP targets to promote European agriculture 
sector development more productive and stable through some support measures such 
as direct payment, market price intervention, production quotas and so on. EU budgets 
a lot annually for supporting and protecting agricultural development. For example, it 
is embraces approximately 90% of EU‟s agricultural output, and about half of EU‟s 
budget was paid to agriculture sector in 2001(Wickman, 2003: p.3), and about 46% 
and 47%  of all community expenditure in 2005 and 2006(National Audit Office, 
2008). OECD‟s report indicated that 35% of EU farmers‟ revenue was from 
government‟s subsidies in 2003, while the figure of Australian and New Zealand were 
only 5%(von Reppert-Bismarch, 2004). In terms of the new framework, CAP 
spending share of total EU budget will decreased to 32% in 2013(EUROPA, 2007). 
Although CAP expenditure reflected a descending trend, it doesn‟t imply that the 
direct subsidy measure will be forgone. According to “CAP towards 2020”, direct 
payment will still be used to support agriculture producers who, EU argued, “face 
very economic and natural conditions across the EU which advocates for an equitable 
distribution of direct aids”(EU Commission, 2010). CAP subsidies to farmers caused 
negative effect to EU consumers as well as foreign countries. EU consumers have to 
pay 80%-100% more for food than those in free-market regime, and because of the 
high import tariff and export subsidies of EU, agriculture sector of developing 
countries also was shocked obviously(Wickman, 2003: p.3). Some studies argued that 
CAP subsidies actually failed to protect farmers‟ income which fell 70% between 
1995 and 2000, and the main beneficiaries were input suppliers and big landowners 
(Mullally, O‟Brien & Stephenson, 2005: p.11). 
Another frequently-used non-tariff measure by EU is technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), which targets mainly are based on the requirement, for example, for health, 
safety, environmental, consumer protection. TBT includes two types according to 
makers, the one is imposed by government, and the other one is imposed by 
non-governmental organizations (Brenton, Sheehy & Vancauteren, 2001; Brülhart & 
Matthews, 2007), here it just discusses the former type of TBT exploited by EU. EU 
commission and council published many directives or standards in recent years, they 
are mainly related to health, safety and environment concerns. For example, 
“Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals” (REACH), 
which was launched in 2006, provides the framework for chemical industry with a 
purpose of protecting environment and human health, it implies that all foreign 
exporters have to comply with the technical standards as well as register and test 
according to a certain procedure. Although REACH regulation of EU is good for 
protecting human health and environment, it may cause some negative impact on third 
countries trading with EU in short term if they cannot find corresponding solutions, 
for instance, it would increase export costs of third countries‟ enterprises, and also 
may hit related industries of third countries especially developing countries whose 
technical level and test conditions are very poor. Therefore, if there is no deferential 
treatment for different countries, the negative impact of REACH on developing 
countries would much stronger than those on developed countries. 
 
Table 5. Recent Directives of EU Technical Barriers to Trade 
Codes Subjects 
DIRECTIVE 
2000/53/EC 
“On End-of Life Vehicles”: Prohibits the use of lead, mercury, cadmium or 
hexavalent chromium in materials and components of vehicles. 
DIRECTIVE 
2002/95/EC 
“On the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment” 
EN 13869:2002 
“Lighters—Child-resistance for Lighters—Safety Requirements and Test 
Methods” 
DIRECTIVE 
2004/108/EC 
“On the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to 
Electromagnetic Compatibility and Repealing Directive 89/336/EEC” 
DIRECTIVE 
2005/32/EC 
“Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign Requirements for 
Energy-using Products and Amending Council Directive 92/42/EEC and 
Directives 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council” 
DIRECTIVE 
2005/84/EC 
“Amending for the 22nd Time Council Directive 76/769/EEC on the 
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of 
the Member States Relating to Restrictions on the Marketing and Use of 
Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations (Phthalates in Toys and 
Childcare Articles)” 
 
REGULATION(EC) 
No 1907/2006 
“Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency, Amending Directive 1999/45/EC and Repealing Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission 
Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC” 
Notes: these directives or standards are often amended and updated according to current status, 
here updated versions are not listed; Source: Collected by Author. 
    
EU‟s export restriction is a long-term barrier to trading with China, it particularly 
embodies in hi-tech export restriction and arm sale embargo. EU Council launched  
its first export regulation measures on dual-use items and technology in 2000(EU 
Council, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), the controlled-dual-use goods list covered ten 
categories(EU Council, 2000a), i.e. Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment(C0), 
Materials, Chemicals, “Microorganisms” & “Toxins” (C1), Materials Processing(C2), 
Electronics(Category 3), Computers(C4), Telecommunications and “Information 
Security”(C5), Sensors and Lasers(C6), Navigation and Avionics(C7), Marine(C8), 
Propulsion as well as Space Vehicles and Related Equipment(C9). For every main 
category, it is further divided into five sub-type, i.e. System, Equipment and 
Components(A), Test, Inspection and Production Equipment(B), Materials(C), 
Software(D) as well as Technology(E). EU‟s aim of exports regulation is to keep their 
intellectual property and keep comparative advantages on technology in the future, 
while it is not conducive to developing countries who really need import advanced 
technology to develop their industries since the export regulation measure are totally 
on high and new technology products. Comparative with technology exports control, 
EU‟s considerations of arm sale embargo against China is based on political issues. 
EU arms embargo against China started in 1989 as a response to Chinese 
pro-democracy movement. EU stated that there still exist human rights abuse and 
security threatens nowadays, thus the arm embargo continues to be maintained. 
However, recent years EU member states have began to discuss whether embargo 
should be ended, but they confront serious pressures from US and Japan (van der 
Putten, 2009). 
   As regards China, it has a long tradition of supporting domestic industries 
development, this is reflected in various five-year plans, including Five-year Plan of 
national economic and social development, Five-year Plan of sectoral development as 
well as Five-year Plan of various industries. China‟s central and local governments 
tend to pay subsidies in order to reduce the financial costs of enterprises, for example, 
if some high and new technology industries are in the encouraging category of 
government, central and local budget will arrange corresponding special subsidies to 
enterprises, scope embodies such as loan interest subsidy, technology update and 
innovation subsidy, talent subsidy and so on. Specially, China government built a 
export tax rebate(ETR) system in 1985 in order to boost exports trade, which includes 
VAT(Value Added Tax) drawback and consumption tax drawback. Total value of ETR 
grew very fast after accession to WTO due to the export growth, figure was about 
$7.57bn in 1999, and increased to $94.96bn in 2009. ETR rate has been adjusted 
several times and current ranging is between 5% to 17%, the most recent adjustment 
was made in 2009 taking into global financial crisis shock account, which increased 
the rebate rate of some products such as TV transmitting equipment and sewing 
machine (rose to 17%), some agricultural processing products and electromechanical 
products(rose to 15%), Corn starch and alcohol(rose to 5%). 
 
Figure 3. China’s Exports Tax Rebates(Billion US Dollars, 1985-2009) 
 
Notes: transforming Renminbi to US dollar based on period average exchange rate; Source: exports tax rebates 
value derived from Finance Yearbook of China 2010(Ministry of Finance, 2010), exchange rate derived from 
China Statistical Yearbook 2011(National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). 
 
Except for some observable subsidies, there are also some hidden subsidizing 
actions which can create positive effect on export indirectly. Here picking a recent 
case as a example for discussion (Box 1), in April 2012, South Korea company, 
SAMSUNG decided to build production base of Nand Flash, it will produce core 
processor for iPhone and iPad. There are three alternative regions who want to obtain 
this project since it can create jobs as well as GDP. Finally this project landed in Xi‟an, 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Shanxi Province due to the local government‟s exciting supportive policies. 
Supportive policies included not only direct investment subsidy and income tax 
exemption, but also free land provision and operating cost subsidies. Yet local 
government committed to build required transportation access to the plant. Actually, 
the production of this project is just the sub-unit of iPhone and iPad, while the final 
products will be produced by another assembly foundry of APPLE INC., FOXCONN 
which will locate in Chengdu, Sichuan province(Chengdu is a city close to Xi‟an, 
Chengdu local government also provides abundant supportive policies to the project). 
After FOXCONN‟s production base in Chengdu comes into work, it will produce 2/3 
of iPad in the world, it implies most of these products will be exported to extra-China 
countries. Undoubtedly, local government‟s support to export-oriented industrial 
investment, in fact, forms a indirect subsidy to China‟s exports. 
 
 
Quotas and Certification regulation are also the traditional non-tariff instruments 
used by Chinese government. China set a Quota & License Administrative Bureau 
attaching to Ministry of Commerce to manage trade quotas and licensed affairs. 
Quotas and license covers both export and import trade, for example, quotas of raw 
materials exports and of wool as well as wool top imports, license of partial steels 
exports and of food processing and packaging equipment. Some of China‟s export 
Box 1. Case of Chinese Local Government Actions for Attracting Investment 
In April 2012, SAMSUNG decided to invest a Nand Flash(core processor for iPhone 4S and 
iPad2) Project in Xi‟an, Shanxi Province, China. the total investment is over $30bn (about 
RMB200bn), it will create lots of outputs and employments.  
What did the local government do in order to get this project? Why SAMSUNG decided to 
land in Xi‟an but not other tow alternative places, Beijing and Chongqing? 
Followings are the policies of Xi‟an municipal government to SAMSUNG: 
 Financial subsidies to SAMSUNG: 30% subsidies of total investment; 
 Preferential Income Tax policies: 10 years exemption and 10 years half reduction; 
 Required Land and Plant Buildings: Free land; Plant Buildings will be built by 
government; 
 Auxiliary policies: RMB0.5bn subsidies per year for the cost of water, power, afforesting 
and logistics; government will be responsible for highway and metro access to plant. 
This decision of Xi‟an caused significant critiques from Chinese people, because it spends too 
much public resources on this project. Similar decision happens frequently in China, local 
governments always provide strong support in order to attract investment including FDI.  
Take SAMSUNG project as an example, this project will produce the core processor of iPhone 
and iPad. At the same time, FOXCONN(contracted with APPLE INC.) has decided to build a 
plant in Chengdu, Sichuan Province(produce iPad; total investment is over $10bn), this plant will 
produce 2/3 of iPad in the world. Chinese cannot buy all of them, it implies 2/3 of iPad consumers 
in the world whose iPad are Made in China. So, there is no doubt that such kind of subsidies will 
indirectly create positive effect on China‟s export trade. (Sources: Integrated by author in terms of 
information published by Chinese local government and newspapers.) 
restriction through quotas and license especially on material products caused protests 
from other import countries. For example, in 2009, EU, US and Mexico appealed to 
WTO on China‟s license regulation to some raw material products such as bauxite, 
coke, spar, magnesium, manganese, silicon metal and zinc, finally WTO confirmed 
that these license actions violated the WTO rules. In January 2011, WTO confirmed 
Chinese quotas and export duties on some raw materials products are illegal as well 
(EU Commission, 2012). 
Yet China‟s exchange regulation creates import and export effect. China‟s 
exchange rate system is Managed Floating Rate System, which make Chinese 
government can intervene in exchange market if it is required. Therefore, Renminbi 
can maintain a higher value to exchange US dollar through governmental controlling, 
it implies value of Renminbi is much lower than that of other currencies, which will 
promote exports and restrict imports. Chinese enterprises and government benefit 
from the Managed Floating Rate System directly, but it is not conducive to other 
countries exporters. So, exchange regulation is always criticized, and other countries 
have been pressuring Chinese government to lessen regulation and let Renminbi 
appreciating. Transparency is also one of the main principles according to WTO 
provisions. Non-transparency laws and regulations can create trade barriers especially 
to imports. After accession to WTO, China have made a big efforts to reform and 
improve its administrative transparency in terms of its commitment to WTO, for 
example, publishing regulations, establishing Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measure(SPS) system, as well as related laws and standards(Biuković, 2010). 
However, some research stated that there still exist some non-transparency regulations 
especially in the sector of industry investment (Kraft, 2010; EU Commission, 2011b, 
2012). 
Additionally, here it treats anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations 
corresponding to dumping and subsidy as the non-tariff barriers to trade as well. 
Actually, dumping is always created by some supportive policies such as various 
subsidies and tax exemption which finally reduced the production cost of enterprises. 
EU‟s agricultural policies and China‟s industrial policies or exchange regulation make 
their products can sale much cheaper in abroad. As a response to dumping, both EU 
and China start to exploit anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations on each 
other‟s products. If they confirm that a certain product exists dumping and impose 
duties on this product, then imposing anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties further 
become tariff barriers. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation can be treated as 
non-tariff barriers too, government can pressure on exporters through investigations 
even if dumping action may not true. Moreover, they also may be used as retaliatory 
measures. For example, as discussed previously, EU started its anti-subsidy 
investigation on coated fine paper from China in the early of 2010 and finally decided 
to impose anti-subsidy duties On 6 May 2011(EU Council, 2011b), which is the first 
time that EU impose anti-subsidy duties on Chinese product. Subsequently, on 30 
August 2010, China government started the first anti-subsidy investigation on potato 
starch from EU and finally decided to impose anti-subsidy duty on 16 September 
2011. It is worth noting that EU impose both anti-dumping duty and anti-subsidy duty 
on the same product, at the beginning, Chinese government argued that it violated the 
WTO rules, while finally China government started to impose both anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy duties on the same product as well. These interactions indicated that 
China‟s action could be a retaliatory response to EU‟s action. In 2012, EU launched 
anti-subsidy investigations on several products from China and also caused the protest 
from Chinese government, if EU finally confirms to impose, probably China will 
respond as the same actions. 
 
4.4 Investment Barriers 
Cross-border investment has developed rapidly in the past decades. In order to 
promote capital flowing across board, developed countries, who have a strong 
advantage on capital, have been making considerable efforts to prevent developing 
countries from foreign invest investment(FDI) restrictions. Actually, from the 
historical perspective, now-developed countries systematically restricted foreign 
investment for protecting domestic industries through various measures, such as limits 
on ownerships, technology transfer, local procurement, mergers and acquisitions 
regulations and so on. Only when domestic industries got strong and competitive 
enough, now-developed countries started to lessen their regulation on FDI(Chang, 
2004). Therefore, generally developing countries have stronger restrictions on foreign 
investment than developed countries.  
However, developed countries still restricted FDI in some sensitive sectors in 
terms of their concerns of national safety or public interest. EU member states mainly 
exert reviews on some merger and acquisition (M&A) related to national safety or 
public interest, namely they tend to intervene in FDI market through the National 
Security Review Mechanism. For example, On 9 December 2004, France enacted 
“Law 2004-1343”, which stated that if foreign investors want to merge or purchase 
some enterprises of sensitive industries related to public order, public safety, national 
defense, arms and explosive, it requires the authorization of government and also 
there are corresponding financial penalties for non-compliance with regulations. 
Sensitive sectors include 11 sectors in terms of the specified list in Decree 2005-1739, 
for example, gambling and casinos, private security, security of information 
technology products and systems, cryptology equipment and some sectors related to 
national defense. In the spring of 2009, German enacted the updated Foreign Trade 
Act, it empowered Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology right to review and 
prohibit purchases of domestic company by foreign investors if purchase poses threats 
to public order and security. Yet United Kingdom exerts reviews on those M&A on 
industries related to national safety, media diversity and financial system stability by 
foreign investors in terms of the “Enterprise Act” launched in 2002 and the 
explanatory memorandum Order launched in 2008.  
Except for National Security Review on M&A of foreign investors, there are also 
some restrictions on single sectors in EU member states (GAO, 2008). For example, 
in France, foreign investment in banking and insurance must be approved by French 
banking and insurance regulators, and some sectors such as atomic energy, coal mines, 
railway passenger transport are not open to FDI. In German, inland waterways, 
employment services, lottery industries are mainly monopolized by public sectors. 
 
Table 6. Selected Foreign Investment Restriction Measures of EU member state 
and China 
Country Laws and Regulations Objectives 
France Law 2004-1343, Decree 2005-1739 
public order, public safety, 
national defense  
Germany German Foreign Trade Act 2009 Public order, public security 
Netherlands Financial Supervision Act 2006 
Competition, financial market 
oversight 
United 
Kingdom 
Enterprise Act of 2002 & Order 2008 
Public interest(National Safety, 
Media Diversity, Financial System 
Stability), control of classified and 
sensitive technology 
China 
Regulations for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors(2009 Revision); 
National Security Review System for Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors(Launched in February 2011);  
Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment 
(2011 Revision); 
Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign Investment in 
Central and Western China (2008 Revision) 
National economic security; 
Protection of critical industries; 
Develop local priority industries; 
Purchase of famous trademarks or 
traditional Chinese brands; 
Source: Modified from GAO(2008, p.8) and Kern(2008, p.34-38). 
 Comparative with European countries, China exerts much stronger restrictions on 
FDI. As a developing country, Chinese government tries to protect and boost its 
domestic industries development through supportive policies. For example, Chinese 
central government laid down Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment 
in order to channel foreign capitals and Catalogue of Priority Industries for Foreign 
Investment in Central and Western China in order to develop competitive industries 
locating in backward regions. According to the current catalogue(2011 revision), only 
parts of industries are open to foreign investors, and some of these open industries are 
restricted in building joint venture or cooperative enterprise with Chinese investors. 
China also built and launched a National Security Review System in February 2011, 
which stated that it requires to be vetted by government if the M&A by foreign 
investors is related to national security. 
 
5. Conclusions and Remarks 
In terms of analysis above all, this paper finds that: EU and China are main trade 
partner for each other, and bilateral economic and trade relation are more and more 
closer; and the close relationship is particularly based on the intra-industrial trade of 
manufacturing industrial products, especially machinery and transport equipment 
products. Trade in services and FDI flows just a small part of EU-China economic 
exchanges; However, from the EU perspective, manufacturing industrial products 
export to China is much less than those import from China, and it is the chief 
contributor of EU‟s trade deficit with China; So, if EU and China want to handle the 
huge trade deficit, they must improve Composition of Trade as far as possible. 
   This paper also find that there still exist a myriad of obstacles to EU-China trade 
and investment interactions, especially non-tariff obstacles such as various subsidies, 
trade and investment restrictions, technical barriers and so on. China‟s market is not 
open entirely, and also it is reported that protectionism is on the rise in Europe 
(Ashton, 2009). Undoubtedly these barriers are key factors of causing EU‟s huge trade 
deficits with China, thus lessening or eliminating trade barriers between EU and 
China can promote trade development and adjusting composition of trade. But, it 
requires joint efforts, mutual trust, frequent interaction and cooperation.  
However, above analysis is just a rough introduction of EU-China economic and 
trade relations (“Economic Partnership”), it didn‟t introduce the “Economic 
Competition” between EU and China. Actually, according to the arguments of EU 
commission, relations between EU and China are Competition and Partnership (EU 
Commission, 2006), which is not only in economic fields but also in political and 
social fields. Another topic is that this paper just focused on the bilateral relations at 
the supranational level, while in fact, as argued by Dai(2006), relations between EU 
and China involves not only bilateral relations at supranational level(EU-China) but 
also bilateral relations at member state level(relation between EU‟s every member 
state and China). Thus if one wants to understanding EU-China economic and trade 
relations completely, it is necessary to consider the performance arising from the 
second type of bilateral relations. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1. Real GDP Growth Rate of China and EU (1971-2013) 
 
Notes: Forecasted Value From 2011 to 2013. 
Sources: China‟s real GDP growth rate data is from World Economic Outlook(WEO) Data provided by IMF; EU‟s 
real GDP growth rate data is from Eurostat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Industrial Structure of EU & China External Trade in Goods 
Industries(SITC) 
EU27 China 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
2000 2010 2000 2010 2009 2009 
Food and live animals 4 4.1 4.9 4.9 2.71 1.47 
Beverages and tobacco 1.6 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.14 0.19 
Crude materials, except fuels 1.8 2.6 4.7 4.3 0.68 14.00 
Energy products 3.4 5.6 16.2 25.4 1.70 12.33 
Oil, fats and waxes 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.03 0.76 
Chemicals 14.0 17.4 7.1 9.1 5.16 11.15 
Manufactured goods classified by material 14.3 12.8 11.2 10.5 15.38 10.71 
Machinery and transport equipment 46.3 42.4 37.4 29.5 49.13 40.57 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 12.1 10.4 14.0 13.6 24.94 8.47 
Products not classified elsewhere 2.4 2.9 1.6 1.9 0.14 0.33 
Source: EU Trade Yearbook 2011(EUSTAT, 2011); China Commercial Yearbook(Ministry of Commerce of China, 
2010).  
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Appendix Table 2. EU Products of which China is one of the top10 Trade 
Partners(2010, Million Euro,%) 
Industrial Classification 
Exports to China Imports from China 
Balance 
Value Share 
China‟s 
Rank 
Value Share 
China‟s 
Rank 
Foods 
Products  
Miscellaneous edible products and 
preparations  
364 4.8 5 NT NT NT  
Beverages  808 4.4 7 NT NT NT  
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks  NT NT NT 1,526 8.9 2  
Vegetables and fruit  NT NT NT 1,440 6.9 3  
Feeding stuff for animals  NT NT NT 130 1.5 6  
Raw Materials  
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits NT NT NT 255 3.9 7  
Cork and wood  248 5.9 7 274 5.4 5 -26 
Textile fibers and their wastes  396 13.3 2 NT NT NT  
Crude fertilizers  4024 29.4 1 NT NT NT  
Crude animal and vegetable materials, 
n.e.s.  
236 5.8 4 NT NT NT  
Fuel Products. Coal, coke and briquettes NT NT NT 112 0.7 9  
Chemicals  
Organic chemicals  2618 6.1 4 3841 11.6 3 -1223 
Inorganic chemicals NT NT NT 1052 8.9 3  
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  2944 3.1 7 2463 5.1 3 481 
Plastics in primary forms  2722 12.1 2 440 3.8 7 2282 
Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.  1555 6.8 3 NT NT NT  
Machinery and 
Equipment  
Power generating machinery and 
equipment  
5806 9.5 2 2823 8.1 3 2983 
Machinery specialized for particular ind.  10289 14.4 1 2270 13.5 4 8019 
General industry machinery and equipment  11935 13.2 2 9620 26.9 1 2315 
Telecommunication, sound, TV, video  1740 4.7 7 37510 50.1 1 -35770 
Office machines and computers  1073 4.5 8 40280 54.2 1 -39207 
of which computer equipment  311 2.7 10 27676 70 1 -27365 
Electrical machinery  10699 12.9 2 40062 38.5 1 -29363 
of which valves, transistors etc.  2002 13.4 2 16691 38.5 1 -14689 
Transport 
Equipment  
Road vehicles  17552 13.7 2 3873 8.3 4 13679 
of which passenger cars etc.  12184 16 2 482 2.2 8 11702 
Aircraft, spacecraft etc.  5012 11.9 2 119 0.4 7 4893 
Ships, boats etc. NT NT NT 7555 33.3 1  
Other 
Manufactured 
Goods  
Textile yarn, fabrics and related products NT NT NT 6602 32.5 1  
Paper, paperboard and articles thereof  724 3.7 6 NT NT NT  
Non-metallic mineral manufactures  1355 4.3 7 5007 19.9 1 -3652 
Iron and steel  1992 5.7 4 3150 12 3 -1158 
Non-ferrous metals  2437 12.2 2 1737 4.7 7 700 
Manufactures of metals  2191 6.7 4 10743 41.3 1 -8552 
Clothing and clothing accessories  407 2.4 10 30513 45.6 1 -30106 
Professional, scientific, controlling material  4216 10.5 2 3015 10.2 3 1201 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  1712 3.6 6 25092 45.1 1 -23380 
Notes: NT represents China is not one of the top 10 partners of EU; Sources: EU Trade Yearbook 2011(EUSTAT, 
2011). 
  
